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DOD'S SEARCH FOR MEANINGFUL ARMS CONTROL

The On-Going Search for EFFECT

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Prior to discussing the details of organization and the specifics of ongoing negotiations, it would be helpful to briefly state the attitudes of the Department of Defense toward arms control agreements. In order to be either enduring or effective, agreements designed to limit or control arms must enhance the security of all parties. Real security can be enhanced only by balanced and safeguarded agreements limiting the military capability of nations in a manner conducive to the achievement of a secure and peaceful world, free of force and the threat of force. The control of arms, as all major efforts for peace, needs to begin with hope, but it must proceed in light of sober realities.

If we fail to follow the legitimate needs of our own security, potential adversaries will chalk it up not to goodwill, but to failure of will; not to our confidence, but to our weakness.

The Department of Defense believes that effective arms control measures, adequately verifiable, will enhance our security and we are, therefore, committed to pursuing them, but we seek progress—not paper. We are not interested in another Kellog-Briand Pact, purportedly guaranteeing a peaceful world but actually bearing a long history of disappointment and disillusionment. In our search for meaningful and effective arms control, we must not be blind to history nor to the dangers inherent in agreements for agreements sake.

ORGANIZATION

Let's now turn to the organizational relationships within the Department of Defense which develop and implement arms control policy. These activities permeate the entire department, but cluster principally in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, the charter of which charges it to develop and coordinate Defense positions, policies,

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

plans, and procedures in the fields of international political-military and foreign economic affairs, including arms control and disarmament. The complexities associated with the various measures under consideration have dictated a tailored organization designed to meet the needs of each. For Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), a SALT Task Force representing every major Defense element has been organized directly under the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. The task force is charged with insuring that departmental positions on this extremely important issue take into account every facet of Defense's interests and provide the best judgment that the department can marshal. Dr. Fred Wikner, heads that Task Force.

Paul Nitze acts as the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for SALT and is the representative of the Secretary of Defense on the SALT delegation. Lieutenant General Edward L. Rowny is the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) representative on the delegation. Brigadier General William F. Georgi is the Deputy U.S. Commissioner on the Standing Consultative Commission, which has been established by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of SALT I.

A DoD task force operating under the aegis of Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs (ISA) deals with Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Europe. Bruce C. Clarke, Jr., is the representative of the Secretary of Defense on the MBFR

Plotters work before display consoles at a NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) operational control center in Denmark. NADGE, the largest electronics defense project ever undertaken, extends from the northern tip of Norway to the eastern frontier of Turkey. (NATO Photo)

Delegation and Maj. Gen. W. D. Crittenberger is the representative of the JCS. Ambassador Stanley Resor, former Secretary of the Army, heads the U.S. delegation.

Responsibility, within the Department of Defense, for the other ongoing arms control negotiations and actions and there is a heavy schedule of them, lies with ISA. Within ISA, these topics are the direct responsibility of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Plans, Policy, and National Security Affairs. He is responsible for the coordination and monitoring of a variety of agreements and proposals on limitations of conventional as well as chemical and biological weapons, policy on nuclear free zones, and demilitarized areas such as Antarctica, outer space, and the seabeds, and of various UN and Conference of the Committee on Disarmament actions and resolutions in the entire field of arms control and arms limitations. Further, each of the individual Services, is charged with providing information and policy recommendations on arms control measures and has an office with specific responsibility for dealing with these topics.

In the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Georgi heads the International Negotiations Division within the Plans and Policy Directorate of J-5, Plans and Policy. This is where arms control

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Born February 2, 1922, at Twin Falls, Idaho, Mr. Jordan attended Idaho State College and is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. A Rhodes Scholar, he holds B.A. and M.A. degrees from Oxford University. In 1960, he received his Ph.D. degree from Columbia University, where he was awarded the Einstein Prize.

Mr. Jordan rose in rank from 1946 to 1972 from second lieutenant to brigadier general, United States Army, from which he retired to take his most recent position at Aspen.

Mr. Jordan is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Asia Society, the Middle East Institute, the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, and a former member of the Association for Asian Studies and the American Political Science Association. Among his books are *Foreign Aid and the Defense of Southeast Asia, Issues of National Security in the 1970's* (editor and contributor), and *Contemporary Foreign Governments, Economics of National Security.*



A U.S. Air Force B-52 Stratofortress (top) lifts off the runway enroute to a simulated target several thousand miles away. Above, a Soviet TU-20 Bear flies an overwater training mission. The U.S. nuclear powered submarine USS Pogy surfaces near Pascagoula, Mississippi.

problems are primarily staffed but other offices within the OJCS also participate. Additionally, support and expertise on these matters are provided by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program, Analysis, and Evaluation; Assistant Secretary of Defense, Intelligence; the Office of the General Counsel; the Assistant to the Secretary for Atomic Energy; and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Over-all, U.S. policies and positions on crucial arms control measures are developed in coordination with the Department of State, the Army Control and Disarmament Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other agencies through the National Security Council system.

This brief summary of organizational relationships assures you that the U.S. takes arms control matters seriously and that important CPS resources are dedicated to them. Our perspective is not one of negativism, but of prudence and caution.

A few of the major issues with which the U.S. is involved are:

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks represent an ongoing, intensive effort to limit strategic arms competition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Before entering discussions with the Soviets, meticulous research with the highest priority was carried out within the United States Government on all aspects of SALT. The difficulty in establishing equivalence between strategic weapons systems, which vary in so many complex ways as do those of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., is a major reason for this intensive research. There is a continuing interagency examination of the issues, and in particular, of the measures that could be employed to verify compliance with any agreement.

The U.S. is now trying, in SALT II, to ensure that essential equivalence is maintained between the strategic forces of the United States and the U.S.S.R.—it is essential not only that this equivalence be maintained but also that it be perceived as such by ourselves and the Soviet Union, and by third party audiences as well.

As a precautionary measure, the Administration has asked the Congress to support in the Fiscal Year 1975



A U.S. Navy Poseidon missile breaks the water seconds after being launched from the nuclear powered submarine USS James Madison. Below, the Soviet Echo II class nuclear powered submarine surfaces in the North Pacific. The Soviet submarine carries 8 cruise missiles and a crew of about 100.

budget, several strategic research & development (R&D) programs, which are not inconsistent with SALT I agreements, as a hedge against the possibility of non-agreement in SALT II and the uncertain actions of the U.S.S.R. These programs have the general objectives of maintaining the sufficiency of our strategic forces, improving our deterrent posture, and making clear to the Soviets that they cannot achieve an advantage by large-scale deployment of the programs now in their R&D program or available in prototype or limited quantities.

The U.S. must be prepared to reduce, maintain at current levels, or if necessary, even increase its level of strategic arms, in order to ensure security. If the Soviet Union insists on developing new strategic systems or otherwise increasing its strategic capabilities, the U.S. may be forced to increase its as well. It is only if we are prepared to counter Soviet increases, and they perceive this determination, that we can hope to deter them from further building their strategic capabilities. We would far prefer, however, to reduce armaments in such a way that a strategic balance can be achieved at the least destabilizing level and lowest cost of forces.

MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS

Now turn to the topic of mutual and balanced force reductions. The negotiations now under way are critical to the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the fundamental structure of Western security. They are of basic significance to NATO and Warsaw Pact relations and offer another opportunity for negotiated reductions which could increase international stability. MBFR, of course, has a particularly important bearing on U.S. military commitments in Europe.

Although force reduction proposals have had roots in European politics over the last 20 years, it was in 1968 that NATO first seriously proposed that concerned European states enter into negotiations on MBFR in Central Europe. In the fall of 1972, an East-West agreement was reached which permitted the NATO-proposed MBFR talks to go forward. Preparatory talks began in Vienna last year, and formal negotiations got underway on October 30, 1973. Negotiations involve 19 countries: 12 on the Western side and 7 Eastern states.

The United States closely coordinates the negotiations with our NATO colleagues in Brussels and with an allied ad hoc group of conferees at the negotiating site in Vienna. In Washington, the strategy for the negotiations is managed by the interagency verification panel chaired by Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State, and the day-to-day control of the operation is maintained by an interagency coordinating committee chaired by ACDA. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS are represented in both these groups, and they also have representatives on the U.S. MBFR Delegation in Vienna. ISA has overall responsibility for MBFR within the Department of Defense.

The Western objective in MBFR is to create a more stable military and security situation with lower levels of forces in Central Europe, while maintaining undiminished security. The U.S. seeks to reduce the concentration of forces, alter the character of forces and limit military activities which can create tension and miscalculation.

Our objective requires taking into account disparities in the military situation in Central Europe where Warsaw Pact ground force manpower and tanks outnumber NATO's and where the pact also enjoys a geographic advantage for reinforcement.

The Western proposal is for a common ceiling on East-West ground force manpower achieved through a first phase of U.S.-Soviet ground force reductions—including reduction of Soviet armor capability—and a second phase that would result in reductions to an over-all common ceiling.

The East sees MBFR as military detente supplementing political detente. The Soviets want to maintain their existing preponderance, the "existing correlation of forces," albeit at a lower level. The pact proposes equal percentage reductions of forces of all 11 direct participants and reductions of ground and air forces, including nuclear weapons.

In sum, in order to provide more stability—the West wants to improve the situation by focusing on an equal outcome with a common ceiling on ground forces. The East is focusing on equal percentage reductions and reductions of all forces, thereby maintaining the existing force relationship.

The third round of negotiations has just begun, and we will be searching for common ground. We remain committed

The United States' newest strategic bomber, the B-1, currently under development, is expected to replace the aging B-52 Stratofortress as the main stay of the Strategic Air Command. Below, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) technician works on a computer at a NADGE site.

to a central concept—undimished military security for NATO is the only rational criteria for establishing force reductions. Mutual reductions offer the best prospects for improving the security situation in Europe at lower levels of forces.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The U.S. is committed to the achievement of effective international restraints on chemical weapons. However, to be "effective" these prohibitions must contain adequate verification provisions.

In the absence of effective international restraints, the U.S. retains a chemical warfare capability designed to deter anyone from using these weapons against us or our allies. Historically, the use of chemical weapons in war has essentially been restrained by threat of retaliation in kind. We believe that such a capability for retaliation continues to serve as a deterrent to such use today.

The chemical weapons of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact represent a serious potential threat to U.S. and allied forces in Europe and elsewhere. We believe that the U.S.S.R. is better prepared to operate offensively and defensively in a chemical environment than any other nation in the world. We believe it has developed, standardized, and stockpiled highly toxic chemical agents for dissemination by ground and air munitions and is technically capable of producing all known toxic agents in sufficient quantities to support full scale operations. It may be of interest that, during the October 1973 war in the Middle East, the Soviets provided the Arabs with chemical warfare defensive equipment. However, no chemical weapons were used during the conflict.

The rationale for maintaining a U.S. chemical weapons capability is based primarily upon the possibility of the Soviet Union's initiating the use of chemical weapons in a conventional war against the U.S. and its allies. In the event of such an attack, and if there were an inability to retaliate effectively in kind, an attempt to redress the situation would probably require the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Abandonment of a retaliatory chemical deterrent, therefore, would entail acceptance of the possible risk of lowering the nuclear threshold.

In 1972, at the CCD, the Soviet Union tabled a draft chemical warfare convention—a comprehensive chemical prohibition. However, the Soviet draft does not contain adequate verification provisions. As you are aware, the adequacy of verification is a very important consideration not only in negotiation of arms control and disarmament agreements, but also in building the confidence in compliance that is essential to such an agreement being more than a piece of paper. The problem of adequate verification for possible chemical weapons limitations has not yet been resolved. This government is continuing its efforts to find such a solution.

OTHER ARMS CONTROL AREAS

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which meets in Geneva, is co-chaired by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. This multilateral forum, currently involving 26 nations, represents the primary organized global effort to seek effective arms control measures. At present, the conference has centered its deliberations on chemical weapons and nuclear test prohibitions but proposals for controls or reductions on all weapons and weapons systems are considered there.

Recently, there has been considerable international interest within the UN and in various conferences, on possible restrictions or prohibitions on certain conventional weapons that are alleged to be inherently "indiscriminate" or to cause "unnecessary suffering." Among these, napalm, land mines, and various antipersonnel fragmentation munitions have been discussed. More recently high velocity small caliber weapons have come under scrutiny in the context of unnecessary suffering. Within DoD, we have a broad range of ordnance, medical, operational, and legal personnel from all Services examine these questions.

There are, of course, many other arms control concepts under active consideration such as expansion of the Seabeds Arms Control Agreement, new nuclear free zones, and reductions in defense budgets. There are also topics allied or closely akin to arms control, such as peacekeeping and peace observation, which receive our careful attention.

A model of the Soviet SS-11 intercontinental ballistic missile.

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